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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Piracy has existed as long as maritime trade, all though the form and methods of piracy has 
varied throughout history.  
In 2008, there was a significant increase in the number of pirate attacks on international 
shipping in the Gulf of Aden, double the number of attacks in 2007. 
1
 By September 2009, 
the number of piracy hijackings reported by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of 
the International Chamber of Commerce had surpassed the total number of hijackings of 
2008. The total number of attacks reported to the IMB‘s Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC), by 
September 2009 was 294. Of these, 34 resulted in successful hijackings of vessels. A total 
of 559 hostages were in those hijackings.
2
. Ninety-seven of the 294 attacks took place in 
the Gulf of Aden, whilst a further 47 took place off the rest of the coast of Somalia. Somali 
pirates accounted for 32 hijackings with 532 crew taken hostage. Four crew members were 
killed.3  
 
A key base of operation for pirates in the Gulf of Aden, Somalia stands for all intents and 
purposes as a failed state.
 
 Aside from the autonomous, broadly self-governed enclaves of 
Somaliland and Puntland in the northern parts of the country, Somalia has suffered under 
―governance‖ by a succession of tribal factions, warlords, Islamist groups, and foreign 
                                                 
1 IML (International Legal Materials) Infocus 090812 ‖Introductory Note to Exchange of letters between 
European Union and Kenya to Prosecute Pirates. 
2 ―Analysis of Somali Pirate Activity in 2009‖ UNITAR 
http://unosat-maps.web.cern.ch/unosat-maps/SO/Piracy/2009/UNOSAT_Somalia_Pirates_Analysis  
3 http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=374:piracy-figures-for-2009-
surpass-those-for-previous-year&catid=60:news&Itemid=51. (Updated numbers for the whole of 2009 are 
currently not yet available.) 
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interventions for the past 18 years.
 4
 After the U.N. withdrew from Somalia in March 1995 
without restoring a central government, little progress has been made in creating a security 
infrastructure—including administrative and legal institutions—on land. Since 2004, the 
U.N. has supported the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) diplomatically 
and financially in an attempt to promote a functioning central government. Although the 
TFG is internationally recognized as the government of Somalia, it has proven to be a weak 
institution hindered by a lack of legitimacy among the Somali population. Since it has no 
navy or coast guard it cannot participate in the security of coastal area.
5
 Since 2008, the UN 
Security Council has passed several resolutions in an attempt to curb the piracy problem off 
the coast of Somalia.
6
 On the background of these resolutions, several military operations 
of both a national and international nature have been launched to secure the maritime 
navigation in the area and to combat the piracy problem.  
1.2 The legal aspect of the piracy problem 
While many suspected pirates have been captured by nations operating in the different 
operations, a recurring problem has been the lack of prosecution. Several countries have 
resorted to a ―catch and release‖-policy, where the pirates are captured and disarmed, and 
subsequently released again. Countries, who do so, have claimed to not have sufficient 
jurisdiction over pirates to have them prosecuted in their own courts. However, this lack of 
jurisdiction has not prevented them from apprehending the pirates in the first place. In other 
cases, countries have had the captured pirates transferred to their national courts for 
prosecution, while yet others have had pirates transferred to third State Parties who have 
been willing to prosecute. The pirates that have been transferred to national courts for 
                                                 
4
  ‖Maritime Security: Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond‖  
By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Richard Weitz, Ph.D., and Martin Edwin Andersen 
The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/sr0059.cfm 
5
  ‖Maritime Security: Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond‖  
By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Richard Weitz, Ph.D., and Martin Edwin Andersen 
The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/sr0059.cfm 
6  Resolutions by the Security Council 2008 and 2009. 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/  
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prosecution face very arbitrary consequences, depending on what country has decided to 
prosecute them. One example is the difference in the length of prison sentence that the 
suspected pirate may risk in different national penal systems: a pirate prosecuted in the 
USA faces possible life in prison, while a pirate tried for the same crime in the Netherlands 
may face up to a maximum of twelve years.  
 
The resurgence of piracy off the coast of Somalia has renewed the focus on the 
international regulations on jurisdiction over piracy. The States involved in combating 
piracy off the coast of Somalia are faced with several legal problems. Some of these 
problems are related to the lack of precedence on the applicability and interpretation of 
international law on piracy in modern times. It‘s only the past couple of years that the 
international community have attempted to apply the various laws on piracy. The 
international community has also undergone major changes during the past centuries in 
areas such as universal human rights, and other parts of international law, while the 
regulations on piracy has remained fairly unchanged, which suggests that what once was 
sufficient legislation on piracy, might not be that today.   
 
This thesis will discuss if and on which grounds States can use force against pirates and 
what options exist in the international society to have suspected pirates prosecuted, with the 
specific focus on the pirate situation off the coast of Somalia. The two major legal 
questions that this thesis will attempt to answer are: 
1. To what extent does the current legal framework allow for use of force against 
Somali pirates? 
2. To what extent does the current legal framework allow for the prosecution of 
Somali pirates  
 4 
1.3 Structure of this report 
Chapter 2 gives and overview over the different legal instruments that are relevant for the 
question of interdiction and prosecution of suspected pirates, as well as the definition of 
piracy from international law. 
 
The rest of this report is divided into two major parts, chapter 3 and chapter 4. 
Chapter 3 discusses the existence of a law on interdiction of pirates, in the light of the 
United Nation‘s Convention on the Law of the Sea and the several Security Council 
Resolutions from 2008 and 2009 on Somali piracy. The impact these resolutions have had 
on the international law on piracy is also considered. The conduct of the major international 
operations against pirates is also described and evaluated, as it shows how the mandate to 
use force against pirates have been interpreted and applied by the different states and 
regional organizations. What limitations exist to the right to use force against pirates? 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the legal mandate in international law to have suspected pirates 
prosecuted. UNCLOS and the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA conventions) are especially considered in this 
context, as well as the relevant parts of the Security Council Resolutions from 2008 and 
2009. This is then considered in relation to the various solutions for prosecuting pirates that 
have been chosen by the United States of America and selected European countries who 
are taking part in the anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, and have had 
suspected pirates in custody. Variances in piracy law in the domestic law of the individual 
countries will be briefly considered. The possibility to prosecute pirates will be considered 
against the structure and mandate of the various anti-piracy operations in so far it‘s 
applicable. Human Rights law is also considered in this context: what limitations does HR 
place upon the states concerning the possibility to prosecute pirates? The Memorandums of 
Understandings between many states and Kenya and/or The Seychelles to have suspected 
pirates transferred there for prosecution is also discussed. 
 5 
In chapter 5 summary is given of the legal (and to a certain extent, political) limitations on 
the states to use force against pirates, as well as to  prosecute pirates, as well as possible de 
lege ferenda solutions to the various problems.  
2 The legal framework 
2.1 Historical perspective on Piracy Law 
A law addressing the issue of piracy can be traced back to the Seventeenth Century. 
The English act on piracy enacted in 1698 was probably the first law of piracy at the 
national level.  Other States such as Germany and the United States then followed suit to 
enact their laws of piracy. These older pieces of legislation show that when piracy was first 
criminalized by law, it was punishable only within the domestic legal domain of a state. 
Later, the piracy issue came into the international scene since it threatened transnational 
maritime commerce and transportation. The first legal document governing piracy in 
international law was the 1856 Treaty of Paris, which ended privateering
7
 by commissioned 
pirate ships. The 1889 Montevideo Convention accepted the principle that the suppression 
of piracy was the responsibility of mankind. The Nyon Agreement of 1937 defined the 
unidentified attacks in the Mediterranean as ―acts of piracy‖. However, the most important 
treaty which codified the international law of piracy was the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the High Seas
8
, which contains eight provisions concerning the suppression of piracy on 
the High Seas. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) simply 
                                                 
7 A privateer was a private person or private warship authorized by a country's government by letters of 
marquee to attack foreign shipping. Privateers were only entitled by their state to attack and rob enemy 
vessels during wartime. Privateers were part of naval warfare of some nations from the 16th to the 19th 
century. 
81958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas  
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf  
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incorporates the anti-piracy provisions of the 1958 Convention without any change 
9
 Those 
few states who have yet to ratify UNCLOS, are party to the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the High Seas, and are thus bound by the same regulations on piracy. 
2.2  Universal Jurisdiction 
Under international law, pirates are subject to so called universal jurisdiction. Normally, 
international law regards criminal jurisdiction as the prerogative of sovereign states. This is 
the case for legislative, executive and judicial jurisdiction.  As a result, the traditional limits 
on national criminal jurisdiction are largely coextensive with the limits of national 
sovereignty.  States have territorial jurisdiction over offenses committed within the confines 
of their territory; the control over national territory is the hallmark of sovereignty. 
Furthermore, states sometimes have jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere, called 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Since the extraterritorial conduct necessarily occurs within the 
territory of some other nation, extraterritorial jurisdiction will often involve competing 
jurisdictional claims between states.
10
  Extraterritorial jurisdiction seeks to prevent such 
problems by dividing jurisdictional responsibility among states in those situations where 
these responsibilities would likely overlap.  Thus a nation can exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over an offense only when it has a clear nexus with the offense that gives it 
jurisdictional priority over other nations. Under traditional rules of international 
jurisdiction, a sufficient nexus exists when the crime is committed by or against a country‘s 
nationals (respectively known as the nationality and passive personality principles of 
jurisdiction).
11
  
 
For as long as sovereignty-based jurisdictional principles have existed (at least since the 
early seventeenth century), any nation could try any pirates it caught, regardless of the 
                                                 
9 Chinese Journal of International Law Advance Access: ― New Developments in the International Law of 
Piracy‖ by Zou Keyuan. http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/jmp006  
10 http://www.harvardilj.org/print/28  Eugene Kontorvich: ‖The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal 
Jurisdiction‘s Hollow Foundation.‖ Harvard International Law ,vol. 45. P. 188-189 
11 P. 589  ―International law‖  by  Malcolm Nathan Shaw  5
th
 edition  2003 
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pirates‘ nationality or where on the high seas they were apprehended. Some legal 
commentators have suggested that universal jurisdiction existed merely because the 
traditional jurisdictional categories did not cover piracy, seeing as the high seas lay outside 
the territorial jurisdiction of any state. However, the ships that pirates attacked were 
registered in a particular nation and thus were within that nation‘s jurisdiction; those on 
board the victim ship were nationals of some state and hence within its passive personality 
jurisdiction. Thus, thus the act of piracy was never without the standard jurisdiction of 
some sovereign state. Today, international law continues to regard piracy as to fall under 
universal jurisdiction. The legitimacy of the principle of universal jurisdiction over piracy 
has been recognized by the international community throughout the past several hundred 
years
12
  and is reaffirmed in the United Nation‘s Convention on the Law of the Sea.13 
2.3 IMO – International Maritime Organization. 
The most important organization concerning the establishment of rules against piracy is 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO). The global mandate of the IMO as a 
specialized agency within the United Nations system was established by the Convention on 
the International Maritime Organization (the ―IMO Convention‖) which was adopted by 
the United Nations Maritime Conference in Geneva on 6 March 1948. IMO's main task has 
been to develop and maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping and its 
remits today include safety, environmental concerns, legal matters, technical co-operation, 
maritime security and the efficiency of shipping.14 The purposes of the Organization, as 
summarized by Article 1(a) of the Convention, are "to provide machinery for cooperation 
among Governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to 
technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to 
encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters 
                                                 
12 Eugene Kontorvich: ‖The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction‘s Hollow Foundation.‖ Harvard 
International Law ,vol. 45. P. 190-191 
http://www.harvardilj.org/print/28   
13 Article 105, UNCLOS 
14 ―Introduction to IMO‖ http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic_id=3  
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concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine 
pollution from ships". Under the IMO, a lot of work has been done in order to better 
establish jurisdiction over piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
2.3.1 The interrelation of UNCLOS and IMO 
 From 1973 the Secretariat of IMO (formerly IMCO) actively contributed to the work of 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in order to ensure 
that the elaboration of IMO instruments conformed to the basic principles guiding the 
elaboration of UNCLOS. Before the UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, explicit or 
implicit references to its provisions were incorporated into several treaty and non-treaty 
instruments of the IMO. Although IMO is explicitly mentioned in only one of the articles 
of UNCLOS (article 2 of Annex VIII), several provisions in that convention refer to the 
―competent international organization‖ in connection with the adoption of international 
shipping rules and standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of 
navigation and the prevention and control of marine pollution.. In such cases the expression 
―competent international organization‖, when used in the singular in UNCLOS, is to be 
understood as to apply exclusively to IMO, bearing in mind that global mandate of the 
IMO as a specialized agency within the United Nations system.
15
 Hence, the provisions of 
The United Nation's Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Conventions established by 
the IMO must be considered in the light of each other. 
2.4 UNCLOS – United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
The laws of piracy are found mainly in The United Nation's Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982(. UNCLOS) which can be seen as the legal framework for all life 
at sea. UNCLOS is acknowledged to be an ―umbrella convention‖ as most of its provisions 
are of a general kind, and have to be implemented by specific operative regulations in other 
                                                 
15
 ‖ Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime 
Organization‖ Study by the Secretariat of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), LEG/MISC.6 
www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=4671/6.pdf  
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international agreements.
16
  It is one of the more comprehensive conventions the UN has 
produced, and it ―consolidated‖ much of previous customary international law, as well as, 
in many respects established new rules on the several areas concerning regulation of the 
world seas. 
UNCLOS art. 100 to art. 107 is dedicated to establishing a legal framework concerning 
piracy. Art. 100 establishes a duty of all State Parties to cooperate to the fullest possible 
extent in the repression of Piracy. Art. 101 gives the definition of piracy as it is to be 
understood in the context of UNCLOS; art. 102 -103 expands upon this definition. Art. 
105, 106 and 107 concern the interdiction of pirates and pirate ships, liability for wrongful 
seizure, as well as who may interdict pirates.  
2.4.1 UNCLOS and definition of piracy 
 UNLCOS Art. 101 defines piracy as three different acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or 
detention, or any a act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or 
passengers of a private ship (..) and directed (..) on the high seas, against any other ship 
(…), or against person or property on board such a ship (..), or (ii) against a ship, (..) 
persons or property outside the jurisdiction of any State. 
(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship (…) with knowledge of 
facts making it a pirate ship, and (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).  
As can be seen, the primary definition of piracy in UNCLOS sets up several criteria for 
what is to be considered piracy. Firstly, the legislation on piracy is only concerned with 
acts perpetrated on the high seas, or ―in a place outside the territorial jurisdiction of any 
state.‖ The latter phrase refers primarily to an island constituting terra nullius or the shore 
of an unoccupied territory.
17
  Any acts of piracy committed in territorial or inland waters 
                                                 
16
 ‖ Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime 
Organization‖ Study by the Secretariat of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), LEG/MISC.6 
www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=4671/6.pdf 
17  ― Principles of Public International Law‖ by Ian Brownli. Sixth edition 2003. Page 230 
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are not addressed, and are legally considered ―armed robbery at sea,‖ rather than piracy.18 
Criticism has been raised against the UNCLOS on account of this, as it would mean that 
pirates would be able to escape capture by moving into the territorial waters of a coastal 
state. In such situations, the pirates would be out of bounds for any other legal intervention 
than that of the coastal state. The foundation for this principle stems from the strong belief 
in sovereign rights and domestic law of States. Two problems arise concerning this 
limitation in the definition of piracy. Firstly, it would require that states enact and enforce 
sufficient domestic legislation. Secondly, for the definition to have any considerable value, 
it would require the area of effect to not be too limited, or from another point of view: that 
the territorial waters of the states are not too extensive. With the establishment of 
UNCLOS, the territorial waters of the State Parties was extended from 3 to 12 nautical 
miles ( art. 3 UNCLOS) in which the State has exclusive jurisdiction , thus greatly reducing 
what was to be considered as the High Seas. In addition, with the UNCLOS came the 
establishment of the Exclusive Economical Zones (EEZ), extending out to 200 nautical 
miles from the coast. These areas are neither part of the territorial waters, nor the High 
Seas. The assumption that the universal jurisdiction over pirates also includes the EEZ has 
so far gone unchallenged. However, art. 58 (3) states that in exercising the high sea rights 
that apply to the EEZ, permitted under arts. 88-115, states must pay due regard to the rights 
and duties, laws and regulations of the coastal state insofar as these are not incompatible 
with the UNCLOS. This could mean that the coastal state could claim the right to impose 
restriction on any military activities therein, also anti-piracy operations. It is this potential 
that drives the need to take into consideration the EEZ‘s as well, when discussing the 
jurisdiction over pirate ships.
19
 Concerning the state of Somalia, it should be mentioned 
that Somalia in 1972, before the establishment of UNLCOS and contrary to its regimes, 
filed a claim to extend its territorial waters to 200 nautical miles of the coast.
20
 However, in 
                                                 
18 ‖Violence at Sea. Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism.‖ Peter Lehr. Chapter 7: ―Piracy and UNLCOS: 
Does International Law Help Regional States Combat Piracy?‖ Martin Murphy.  
19
 ‖Sketching the Debate on Military Activities in the EEZ: An Editorial Comment‖ by Sienho Yee 
Chinese Journal of International Law 2010 9(1):1-7; doi:10.1093/chinesejil/jmq009 
20 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/SOM.htm 
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recent counter-piracy activity this claim has been left unmentioned by the Transitional 
Federal Government of Somalia, as well as by the various nations part-taking in counter-
piracy mission 
The UNCLOS‘ definition limits piracy to acts committed to ―private‖ ends, as opposed to 
―public‖ or ―political‖ ends. As a result of this distinction, the definition of piracy under 
UNCLOS excludes acts carried out by warships or other government vessels, unless these 
have been seized unlawfully and the used to perpetrate piratical acts. It has been debated 
whether the criteria ―private ends‖ excluded acts of piracy committed for political ends; 
this could mean that UNCLOS might not be applicable to acts of maritime terrorism or acts 
by political insurgents, all though the acts in nature may be the same as piracy.
21
 In relation 
to the situation in Somalia, this possible limit to the definition of piracy can prove to be of 
high importance in the future. The past years have seen an increase in organized extremist 
groups fighting the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, and several terrorist 
attacks against the government and NGO‘s working in the country. A credible link between 
such groups and pirates working off the Coast of Somalia has yet to be established; 
however, should any such link be established, i.e. that the piracy was funding such terrorist 
groups, it would be important to clarify if the rules of the UNCLOS concerning combating 
piracy still would be applicable. On way of considering the  criteria of ―private ends‖ is in  
a historical context; it was used to differentiate between ―piracy‖ and ―privateering,‖ the 
latter being a form of piracy under license of a State Government which existed up until it 
was abolished by the Declaration of Paris in 1856.
22
 Hence, the criterion ―private ends‖ 
would refer to an act of piracy that is not sanctioned by governmental authority:  
”The test of piracy lies not in the pirate’s subjective motivation, but in the lack of public 
sanction for his or her acts. (…) To claim that ‘political’ motive can exclude an act from 
the definition of piracy is to mistake the applicable concept of ‘public’ and ‘private’ acts. 
                                                 
21 ‖Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea‖ Douglas Guilfoyle (2009). Page 36-37 
22 ‖Violence at Sea. Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism.‖ Peter Lehr. Chapter 7: ―Piracy and UNLCOS: 
Does International Law Help Regional States Combat Piracy?‖ Martin Murphy. 
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The essence of a piratical act is that it neither raises ‘the immunity which pertains to state 
and governmental acts’ nor engages state responsibility.”23 
By this definition, any maritime criminal act or act of terrorism might fall under the 
definition of piracy in UCLOS, as long as the acts in their nature fit the definition given in 
international law. By extension, this might mean that the universal jurisdiction over piracy 
to include any form of hijacking of a ship by a another ship, as long as the hijacking ship is 
not operating on behalf on any state. This would extend the universal jurisdiction, including 
the right to intervene against such actions, to all maritime acts of terrorism that fit the 
description. However, the sovereignty of the flag state over its ships would be equally 
reduced. Such an interpretation of the term ―private ends‖ has not yet been put to the test in 
the international community, but it might well become relevant in the current ―war on 
terrorism.‖ 
2.5 The SUA convention – The Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation. 
Concern about unlawful acts that threaten the safety of ships and the security of their 
passengers and crews grew during the 1980s and motivated states to negotiate and 
subsequently adopt The Convention on The Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation. This concern stemmed from reports of crews being 
kidnapped, ships being hijacked, deliberately run aground, or blown up by explosives. Due 
to these developments, especially the 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro, the UN General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 40/61 in 1985, urging States to co-operate in contributing to 
the elimination of causes underlying terrorism and invited the IMO to study the problem of 
terrorism aboard or against ships with a view to making recommendations on appropriate 
measures. In response to the Achille Lauro hijacking, the Governments of Austria, Egypt, 
and Italy made a proposal in November 1986 that the IMO prepare a convention on the 
subject of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation.
24
  To supplement their 
                                                 
23 ‖Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea‖ Douglas Guilfoyle (2009). Page 36-37. 
24International Maritime Organization 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=686  
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efforts, the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO issued a circular (MSC/Circ.443) on 
measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships. According 
to the circular, governments, port authorities, administrators, ship-owners, shipmasters, and 
crews should take appropriate measures to prevent unlawful acts that may threaten 
passengers and crews. As a result, the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation was adopted in 1988.  
25
 
 
The SUA convention does not target piracy as such. Rather, it lists a number acts that 
should be considered illegal. Article 1 and 2 lists the offences that the convention is 
designed to cover, which include taking control over a ship by force; performing an act of 
violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation 
of that ship; destroying a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to 
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; and  injuring or killing any person, in connection 
with the commission or the attempted commission of any of the offences mentioned 
above.
26
  While piracy is not mentioned explicitly in the SUA conventions, it is still 
considered to be an important and relevant legal instrument on piracy.  
2.5.1 The 2005 Protocol to the SUA convention. 
In October 2005, the International Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties was 
held at the IMO Headquarter to consider the draft protocols prepared by the Legal 
Committee. The Conference adopted the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the Protocol 
of 2005 to the protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms on the Continental Shelf. 
27
 
The 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention added a new Article 3 which extended the 
                                                 
25The SUA convention 
http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/maritime.pdf    
26 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful acts of violence against the safety of  Maritime Navigation  
(SUA) http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/aptmaritime.pdf  
27 International Maritime Organization 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=686 
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number of acts considered unlawful under the convention.
28
 The new unlawful acts 
included on the most part the use of explosive, radioactive or BCN material, on, against or 
from a ship, when the purpose of the act is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
Government or an international organization to do or abstain from any act. Also unlawful 
are the transportation of such materials, and the intentional transportation of a person who 
has committed acts considered unlawful under the convention. The protocol also made it an 
offence to unlawfully and intentionally injure or kill any person in connection with the 
commission of any of the offences in the Convention; to attempt to commit an offence; to 
participate as an accomplice; to organize or direct others to commit an offence; or to 
contribute to the commissioning of an offence. This part of the protocol relates mainly to 
the combating terrorism, and is in a lesser degree relevant to the combating of piracy. 
The 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention also covered the provisions for boarding. The 
new article 8bis in The 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention. covered co-operation and 
procedures to be followed if a State Party desires to board a ship flying the flag of a State 
Party when the requesting Party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or a person 
on board the ship is, has been, or is about to be involved in the commission of an offence 
under the Convention.
29
 
The authorization and co-operation of the flag state is required before such a boarding. A 
State Party may notify the IMO Secretary-General that it would allow authorization to 
board and search a ship flying its flag, its cargo and persons on board if there is no response 
from the flag state within four hours. A State Party can also notify that it authorizes a 
requesting Party to board and search the ship, its cargo and persons on board, and to 
question the persons on board to determine if an offence has been, or is about to be, 
committed. The use of force is to be avoided except when necessary to ensure the safety of 
officials and persons on board, or where the officials are obstructed to the execution of 
authorized actions. Article 8bis includes important safeguards when a State Party takes 
                                                 
28 2005 protocol to the SUA convention 
 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/49f58cee2.pdf  
29 The SUA Convention  http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/aptmaritime.pdf  
 
 15 
measures against a ship, including boarding. The safeguards include: not endangering the 
safety of life at sea; ensuring that all persons on board are treated in a manner which 
preserves human dignity and in keeping with human rights law; taking due account of 
safety and security of the ship and its cargo; ensuring that measures taken are 
environmentally sound; and taking reasonable efforts to avoid a ship being unduly detained 
or delayed. As of December 31
st
 2009 The 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention had been 
signed by 10 different states and had yet to enter into force. The original Convention on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988 has been 
in force for the contracting parties since 1992 with 156 contracting parties.
30
   
2.6 Recent Security Council Resolutions concerning Piracy off the coast of 
Somalia 
The growing piracy problem off the coast of Somalia caused grave concern within IMO, 
and led to the IMO encouraging the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia to give its 
consent to foreign warships to enter its territorial sea when combating piracy
31
. The TFG 
consented to this and advised the UNSC thereof, which resulted in UNSCR 1819 (2008) In 
this resolution the Security Council decided that for a period of 6 months from the date of 
the resolution, that States and regional organizations cooperating with the Transitional 
Federal Government of Somalia in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the 
coast of Somalia might: 
(a) Enter into the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing 
Acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action 
Permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international 
Law; and 
(b) Use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with 
Such action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant 
                                                 
30 Status of conventions by country.  
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=248  
31
 IMO resolution ―Piracy and armed robbery against ships in the waters off the coast of Somalia.‖  
 Doc. A 25/Res.1002 (December 2007) http://www.vta.ee/atp/public/1002.pdf  
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International law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.  
By UNSCR 1846 (2008) the Security Council extended the mandate by 12 months. This 
was reaffirmed in the UNSCR 1851 (2008) which further extended the mandate by inviting 
all States and regional organizations fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia to conclude 
special agreements or arrangements with countries willing to take custody of pirates in 
order to embark law enforcement officials (―ship riders‖) from the latter countries, in 
particular countries in the region, to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of persons 
detained for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, provided that 
the advance consent of the TFG was obtained for the exercise of third state jurisdiction by 
ship riders in Somali territorial waters and that such agreements or arrangements did not 
prejudice the effective implementation of the SUA Convention. 
 
3 A Law on Interdiction? 
Does a law on interdiction against pirates exist? On what grounds can states use force and 
apprehend pirates on the open sea and, within the territorial waters of Somalia?  
The right to use force against ships on the high seas is a question of who has jurisdiction. 
By art. 92 (UNCLOS) ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and (...) shall be 
subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the High Seas in administrative, technical and social 
matters. Art. 92 (UNCLOS) is, however not clear on the limits of this jurisdiction. What is 
meant by administrative, technical and social matters? It has long been a general customary 
rule of international law that the Flag state has exclusive jurisdiction over everything that 
happens on board a ship flying its colors.
32
 The Flag states jurisdiction over a ship is 
closely linked to the principle of sovereignty. That the UNCLOS does not state this in any 
obvious manner, does not negate the existence and validity of this rule. The UNCLOS is 
considered to codify customary law on the Seas, but it should not be considered to remove 
                                                 
32  ICJ: The case of the SS Lotus. http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.09.07_lotus/  
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customary rules that were not specifically included in the Convention. This means that on 
board the ship it is the national rules and regulations of the Flag state that apply. This can 
be seen as an extension of the territorial principle, in which a state may have jurisdiction 
over anything that occurs within its territory. By art. 97 ( UNCLOS), in case of penal 
responsibility of any person in service of the ship, no arrest or detention of the ship can by 
ordered by any authorities other than those of the flag State.33  Crime committed on board 
ships on the High Seas is as such first and foremost considered a matter of the Flag state.  
There are, however, special rules concerning the use of force against pirates. 
 
3.1 UNCLOS and the mandate to use force. 
UNCLOS Art. 105 states that on the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction 
of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship (…), or a ship  taken by piracy and under 
the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. 
This places 2 criteria for the use of force against pirates. Firstly, the definition of piracy 
must be satisfied. Otherwise the regulations on piracy would not apply. Secondly, the ship 
that is to be seized on account of piracy has to be considered either hijacked by pirates 
(again, the definition of piracy becomes relevant) or a pirate ship in itself. By article 103 ―a  
ship (…) is considered a pirate ship (…) if it is intended by the persons in dominant control 
to be used for the purpose of committing one  of the acts referred to in article 101 (the 
definition of piracy). The same applies if the ship (…) has been used to commit any such 
act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act.‖   
Acts of piracy committed by a warship or a government ship whose crew has mutinied and 
taken control of the ship are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship, and are also 
considered pirate ships.
34
 
Illegal attacks on or seizures of innocent merchant ships by warships or government ships 
result in the delictual responsibility of the aggressor‘s flag state, but the offending ship does 
                                                 
33 UNCLOS Article 97 (3) 
34  UNCLOS article 102 
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not become a pirate ship under the definition of UNCLOS, and does not trigger the 
universal jurisdiction over piracy. 
Although UNCLOS mandates ―any state‖ to seize pirate ships, this does not mean that any 
ship may interdict pirates. . Article 107 expands on who specifically has the mandate to 
such use of force: ―A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships or 
(...), or other ships (...) clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and 
authorized to that effect.‖ Thus, no private ship is authorized to use force against ships 
hijacked by pirates; only governmental vessels can be used to that effect. That being said, 
all and any State has the opportunity to undertake such a mission, provided that the 
hijacked ship is not within the territorial jurisdiction of any State. By the rules of UNCLOS 
this right of any State to take action against pirates must be seen as to supersede the flag 
states exclusive jurisdiction over the ship
35
.  
 
3.1.1 Applicability of the definition of piracy. 
As mentioned above, one criterion for the use of force against pirates is that the suspects 
and/or their acts satisfy the definition of piracy. This raises the question of when the criteria 
of the definition are fulfilled. As can be seen by the definition of piracy in article 101, both 
the act of piracy and any facilitating thereof is considered illegal. Hence both the pirates as 
well as anyone accessory to piracy may well be subject to the universal jurisdiction of 
UNCLOS. It‘s important to clarify that the regulations on piracy is not meant to establish 
any international penal law. What the regulations do however is to establish that when the 
definition of piracy is satisfied, the suspected pirates are ―fair game‖ to any state that 
wishes to apprehend them and establish jurisdiction; the universal jurisdiction can be 
applied. Up until that point, the jurisdiction over any criminals who board another ship, or 
                                                 
35 The question of liability for any damage to the ship, crew or cargo during any military or police operation 
against a ship hijacked by pirates remains unresolved. Unjustful seizure of ships hijacked by pirates is 
covered by UNCLOS article 106: ―Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been 
effected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be liable to the State the nationality of 
which is possessed by the ship or aircraft for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.‖ This does not, 
however, cover the question of liability for damage to the vessel or personnel in a justfull seizure. This is 
currently not a debated issue, but may become so in the future, when considering the number of different 
nationalities that may be among the crew as well as the private stakes in the ship and the cargo. 
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steal from another ship are subject to the other customary principles of .jurisdiction of the 
high seas. The question remains when the criteria of the piracy regulations is fulfilled. 
Attempts to commit piracy is not covered by the wording of the regulations in UNCLOS. 
Whether or not a certain act is sufficient to be called piracy and trigger the universal 
jurisdiction must be a matter of interpretation. However, by which standards this 
interpretation should happen is not quite clear. The International Tribunal of the Law of the 
Sea has jurisdiction over any dispute which is submitted to it in accordance with Part XV 
of UNCLOS concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, and would 
have competence to decide the applicability of the piracy laws in UNCLOS.  The tribunal 
has only competence to settle disputes which State Parties bring forward concerning the 
interpretation and application of UNCLOS. 
36
It cannot take upon itself to interpret the 
regulations of UNCLOS further than the limits of any disputes between State Parties. There 
has been no cases concerning the interpretation of art. 101 of UNCLOS brought before The 
Tribunal as of yet. This would mean that currently it may be up to the individual states to 
decide whether the situation at hand is covered by the law on piracy in UNCLOS. . This 
may give varying results, depending on which State is considering the case at hand. The 
line between attempt and actual act is interpreted differently in different traditions of penal 
law theory. As a consequence, it may be up to the individual countries to decide if the 
concept of universal jurisdiction of UNCLOS is applicable at all. 
3.1.2 Limits to the use of force by UNCLOS. 
It is generally agreed that a right to resort to a threat or use of force to effect visits, search 
and seizure if a ship only exists in the case of a known pirate ship or a ship the behavior of 
which gives reasonable grounds for suspecting her of piracy.
37
 The question remains to 
what extent a state `s warship may use force against a suspected pirate ship, or a ship 
hijacked by pirates.  The mandate to use force by UCLOS is the right of every State to 
"seize" a ship under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on 
                                                 
36 http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
LAW OF THE SEA. Art 21 
37 ―Principles of Public International Law‖ by Ian Brownli. Sixth edition 2003. Page 233 
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board, meaning that the warship of any state may have the right to board and take control 
of the ship and any persons or cargo on board. The right to use force in this process is 
becomes relevant only when the suspected pirates in control of a ship are mustering a 
resistance. The limits to the use of force are not covered by the wording of the relevant 
articles in UNCLOS.  
International law does not say much about the manner or the amount of force that may be 
used on the High Seas when combating pirates. What rules apply to the use of force against 
pirates may be dependent on whether the interdiction of pirates is considered an armed 
conflict or a police operation. The use of military efforts (warships) against pirates
38
 might 
indicate that action taken against pirates be considered to fall under the definition of armed 
conflict, and hence, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) would apply. When considering 
other aspects of piracy, this is quite unlikely. Pirates do not fall under the definition of 
combatants
39
 in IHL, and the use of force against pirate does not amount to an armed 
conflict of an international
40
 or national
41
 character. Rather, the use of force against pirates 
should be considered a policing operation against criminals, in which case it‘s the law of 
the intervening ship and customary international law that apply. Article 9 of the UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides that 
―Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defense or 
defense of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the 
perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person 
presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and 
only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event, 
intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to 
protect life‖. This should be applicable to the use of force against pirates.  
                                                 
38 UNCLOS article 107. 
39 Article 43-44 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. 
40 Common Article 2, Para 1 Geneva Conventions 
41  Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II cover the rules for internal 
armed conflicts. 
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In general, it should be assumed that any use of force should be consistent with the general 
legal principles for the use of force in any police or military action: any use of force must 
be necessary and proportionate to the threat.
42
   
3.1.3 Implications of the UNSCRs on the Law on Interdiction. 
The Security Council has linked the activities of pirates off the coast of Somalia with the 
notion of a threat to international peace and security. Since Resolution 733/1992, the 
Security Council has routinely invoked Chapter VII as regards the situation in Somalia, 
43
 
and has stated that such a situation constitutes ‗a threat to international peace and security,‘ 
and in its first resolution on piracy off the coasts of Somalia, ‗ determine[d] ‘ that such 
piracy ‗ exacerbate[s] the situation in Somalia which continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security in the region‘44 The link is made indirectly, avoiding the 
criticism which the Council often incurs when applying the notion of threat to international 
peace and security, to matters hitherto not considered to be covered by it. It nonetheless 
achieves the objective that action against piracy off the Somali coasts be conducted within 
the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
45
  
These resolutions, while using the term ―piracy,‖ do not define it. References to the 
provisions of UNCLOS and the statement that these provisions ‗ provide guiding principles 
for cooperation to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy ‘ indicate that the 
starting point is definition  of piracy in the Convention. These resolutions, however, always 
mention ―armed robbery‖‘ together with piracy. Armed robbery is not defined. It is a term 
routinely used within the framework of IMO, and may be understood to include all acts of 
violence the purposes of which are identical or similar to those of piracy but are not 
                                                 
42 ‖Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea‖ Douglas Guilfoyle (2009). Page 66 
43 SC Res 733 of 23 Jan. 1992, at Para. 5. 
44
 SC Res 1816 of 2 June 2008, penultimate preambular Para., and thereafter in all the Council‘s resolutions 
on piracy off the Somali coast. 
45
 The European Journal of International Law Vol. 20 no. 2 ―Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: 
Developments off the Coast of Somalia.‖ Tullio Treves 
Downloaded from http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org at University of Oslo, Norwegian Institute of Human Rights 
on April 20, 2010 
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covered by the conventional definition of it, in particular because they may be perpetrated 
without using a ship against the target ship.46  In IMO ―armed robbery,‖ however, refers 
only to activities in waters under the jurisdiction of a state, so that it does not extend the 
scope of provisions on piracy to acts committed on the high seas unless two ships are 
present. This is what the Security Council Resolutions do, as they use the expression ‗ 
piracy and armed robbery against vessels in the territorial waters of Somalia and the high 
seas off the coast of Somalia ‘47 As two or more ships are involved in most of the Somali 
cases, the  mention of ‗ armed robbery ‘ would seem not to be strictly dictated by the needs 
of existing practice, and rather inspired by the aim of including all acts connected with 
piracy (such as preparatory acts) and future acts involving only one ship. 
 
Resolution 1816 (2008), Resolution 1846 (2008), Resolution 1951 (2008) and Resolution 
1897 (2009) all reaffirm the right of foreign states to enter into Somali territorial waters to 
combat piracy. It was emphasized in all above mentioned resolutions that this extension of 
jurisdiction on piracy only would apply to the situation in Somalia, and should not affect 
the rights or obligations of Member States under International law. This included any rights 
or obligations under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, with respect to any other 
situation. It was also underlined that this resolution was not to be considered as establishing 
international law, and that this extension of authorization was based on the consent of the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. 
The enforcement jurisdiction over suspected pirates was reiterated in the UNSCR 1851 
(2009). Paragraph 6 states that  
                                                 
46
 IMO Res A 922(22) of 29 Nov. 2001 adopting the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: ‗armed robbery against ships means any unlawful act of violence 
or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of ―piracy‖ directed against a ship or 
against persons or property on board such a ship within a State‘s jurisdiction over such offences; the 
definition is almost literally repeated in Art. 1(2) of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on combating 
piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia of 28 Apr. 2005, 44 ILM (2005) 829; and in Art. 1(2) of the 
IMO -sponsored Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in 
the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, adopted in Djibouti on 29 Jan. 2009, available at: 
www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id _ = _ 1773&doc_id _ = _ 10933 (visited on 20 Feb. 2009).  
 
47 Res. 1816, penultimate preambular Para.; res. 1846, penultimate preambular Para 
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States and regional organizations cooperating in the fight against piracy and armed 
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia for which advance notification has been provided by 
the TFG to the Secretary-General may undertake all necessary measures that are 
appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at 
sea, pursuant to the request of the TFG, provided, however, that any measures undertaken 
pursuant to the authority of this paragraph shall be undertaken consistent with applicable 
international humanitarian and human rights law. 
This grants the cooperating states authority to conduct counter-piracy on Somali soil. It is, 
however, quite clearly subject to Somali consent. The scope of authority is limited by 
Somalia‘s request for such action to be taken and does not widen the mandate of the forces 
involved.
48
  Interestingly the resolution refers to ―applicable humanitarian law‖ which 
could suggest the possible application of the law of armed conflict. This should not be 
construed to establish the existence of an armed conflict between the pirates and the 
international naval forces in the region. One way of interpretation would be that the 
Security Council is acknowledging that some Somali pirates may also be civil war 
insurgents and in those cases any international counter-piracy forces on land may be best 
considered forces intervening in an otherwise internal conflict at the invitation of the 
government. This does not mean that the law of military targeting would be applicable to 
any pirates at shore; pirates are criminals to be captured using reasonable force, not 
combatants that may be lawfully killed in armed conflict.
49
 Moreover, this resolution shows 
the problems concerning combating piracy within the territory of another state, and the lack 
of applicable international law, namely, which laws are applicable to policing operations 
conducted by foreign military personal on within the ground territory of another state. 
 
The question arises in what manner the recent resolutions by The Security Council extend 
the legal mandate to use force against pirates, by the wording ―all necessary means.‖ The 
wording is the same as used in Security Council resolutions on military enforcement and 
peace-keeping operations. The mandate to use force that the UNSCR‘s establish is not 
                                                 
48 Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea‖ Douglas Guilfoyle (2009). Page 69. 
49 Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea‖ Douglas Guilfoyle (2009). Page 70 
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without restrictions. Firstly, only States co-operating with the TFG (States that have 
permission from the Somali government) may act under the mandate of the resolutions. 
Somalia has been considered to be almost without governance, but it retains its sovereignty 
over its territorial seas. 
The actual mandate to use force is found in the initial UNSCR 1816 (2008) paragraph 7 
letter A, which authorizes the States cooperating with the TGF to enter Somalia‘s territorial 
waters for the purpose of combating piracy. Once within the territorial waters of Somalia, 
the States may ―in a manner consistent with such action permitted on the high seas with 
respect to piracy under relevant international law” use all necessary means to repress acts 
of piracy and armed robbery   
As mentioned under chapter 3.1.2, the use of force against pirates should be governed by 
the same principles as the any policing operation. More unclear is the mandate to use ―all 
necessary means.‖ This is a mandate that is more commonly used in military operations 
than policing operations, which raises the question as to whether the permissible use of 
force against pirates goes beyond that of any policing operations. Considering the 
statements in Resolution 1816 (2008) that it was not intended to expand or change 
international law, it should be presumed that the Security Council Resolutions do no extend 
the right to use force against pirates beyond that which is accepted as customary 
international law. This means that the enforcing states presumably cannot for example just 
sink the ship where the pirates are. The actual use of force will be limited to pursuing pirate 
or hijacked vessels, seizing it and arresting the suspected pirates. 
In summary, the UNSCR‘s have not been intended to change international law in the area 
of piracy. The resolutions do not allow for increased use of force against the pirates, and 
the right to apprehend pirates within the territorial waters of Somalia is still dependent of 
the permission of the TGF.  
Seeing as the resolutions of the Security Council does not change international law and is 
dependent on the permission of the TFG for any anti-piracy activity within the Somali 
territorial waters, one could ask if such resolutions are at all necessary. The permission to 
use force against pirates is already part of international law by UNLCOS, and States might 
well have been able to enter into agreements with the TGF to combat pirates within the 
 25 
territorial seas without the UNSCR‘s. One might say that the permission given by the TGF 
is quite ―pointless‖ as the TGF wields very little power and control in the state of Somalia. 
Therein lays also much of the political reasoning behind the resolutions. In addition to 
bringing focus to the problem of piracy and promote it on the international agenda, the 
UNSCRs also recognizes the TGF as a legitimate government and strengthens its 
sovereignty by explicitly making any action it its territorial sea dependent on its 
permission. 
3.2 Current Use of the Laws on Interdiction 
There are several military operations conducted off the Coast of Somalia as a result of the 
Resolutions by the Security Council. The three main ongoing operations are 
The European Union Naval Operation against Piracy (ATALANTA) 
Operation Ocean Shield (NATO Maritime Group) and the US-led Coalition Maritime 
Force (Combined Task Force 151) 
The various international operations operate on different organizational mandates, and 
consist of many different nations. This has a consequence to which legal system is 
applicable in their work to repress piracy; and affects both the applicability of national and 
international law. Particularly, which set of laws apply to the actual interdiction of ships 
and use of force and detention of pirates are important questions that need to be clarified. 
The varying mandate and nature of this military operation has direct effect on the 
jurisdiction over captured pirates.   
When defining the jurisdiction over interdiction and prosecution of suspected pirates on 
both the High Seas as well as within the territorial waters of Somalia, there are as 
mentioned several factors that may come in to play. Not only the universal jurisdiction of 
the UNCLOS, the domestic law of the participating states and the general international 
principles on jurisdiction are of relevance, but also the structure and the mandate of the 
various anti-pirate operations. The varying mandate and nature of these military operations 
has direct effect on the jurisdiction over captured pirates.   
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3.2.1 Operation ATALANTA -European Union Naval Operation against Piracy 
The European Union is currently conducting a military operation to help deter, prevent and 
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. 
This military operation, named European Union Naval Force Somalia – Operation 
ATALANTA, was launched in support of Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838 and 1846 which 
were adopted in 2008 by the United Nations Security Council. 
Its mandate is to contribute to the protection of vessels of the World Food Program (WFP) 
delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; the protection of vulnerable vessels 
sailing in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast.; employ the necessary measures, 
including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of 
piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where they are present. 
This operation – the European Union‘s first naval operation – is being conducted in the 
framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The mandate of the 
operation is based on the Council of the European Union‘s of December 8 2008.50  
The operation which was scheduled for an initial period of twelve months has now been 
extended by the council until Dec 2010. During this period up to 12 EU ships and a number 
Maritime Patrol Aircraft will operate at any one time. At the present time (January 2010), 
eight EU member states are making a permanent operational contribution to the operation: 
Italy, Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, Luxemburg and Greece. 
Contributions from third countries such as Norway are participating as well. Also, a 
number of Cypriot, Irish, Finnish, Maltese and Sweden military personnel supplement the 
team at the Northwood Operation Headquarters
51
. 
3.2.1.1 Operational mandate of ATALANTA 
The presence of the EU naval forces operating in off the coast of Somalia is mandated in 
the recent UNSC resolutions and the decisions of the Council of the European Union; more 
                                                 
50
 DECISION 2008/918/CFSP of 8 December 2008 on the launch of a European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali 
coast (ATALANTA) 
51 http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/ 
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specifically the ―COUNCIL JOINT ACTION‘s‖ (2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008) 
decision to establish a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.‖  By 
article 1 of this decision, the European Union shall 
”conduct a military operation in support of Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 
1838 (2008) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in a manner consistent with 
action permitted with respect to piracy under Article 100 et seq. of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea signed in Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 (..) and by 
means, in particular, of commitments made with third States, hereinafter called 
‘ATALANTA’ in order to contribute to: 
— the protection of vessels of the WFP delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, 
in accordance with the mandate laid down in UNSC Resolution 1814 (2008), 
— the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, in 
accordance with the mandate laid down in UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008),” 
The participating nations are under a central EU command. Under the responsibility of the 
Council, the Political and Security Committee exercises the political control and strategic 
direction of the EU military operation and is authorized to take the relevant decisions in the 
planning and execution of operation ATALANTA.
52
  
The participating nations are not solely acting on behalf of the European Union. The 
individual military contingents are still under the command of their respective national 
states and domestic law, which places them in a dual role.  
The decision to apprehend pirates will be made by the Commander of the respective ships; 
the officer will at that point be acting as an EU naval Commander. The actual apprehension 
of the suspected pirates will be conducted under the common Rules of Engagement for 
NAVFOR.
53
  
                                                 
52
 COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/851/CFSP Article 7-8. 
53 It should be mentioned that the apprehension or detention of pirates is not necessarily considered the same 
as an actual arrest of the pirates in the legal sense of the word. The pirates might not be ―arrested‖ per say 
until they have been transferred to a legal institution with authorization to prosecute. See case of Medvedev v 
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3.2.2 Operation Ocean Shield 
In late 2008, NATO started to provide escorts to UN World Food Program vessels 
transiting through these dangerous waters under Operation Allied Provider (October-
December 2008). This operation was succeeded by Operation Allied Protector (March-
August 2009) and currently Operation Ocean Shield, which additionally offers training to 
regional countries in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities.
54
 This 
operation was approved by the North Atlantic Council on 17 August 2009 with reference to 
the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1816, 1846 and 1851 and is currently 
being implemented by the Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG 1).
55
 The operation 
is mandated by the above-mentioned UN Security Council Resolutions. 
Operation Ocean Shield is led and executed by a central command. The nations currently 
participating in Operation Ocean Shield are USA, Canada, United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Denmark. 
 
3.2.3 US-led Coalition Maritime Force (Combined Task Force 151) 
Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 is a multinational task force established to conduct 
counter piracy operations throughout the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) area of 
responsibility. Their mission is to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to 
protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all 
nations. United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) commands the 
Combined Maritime Forces operating in the Arabian/Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of 
Aden, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean. In January 2009, the command established 
                                                                                                                                                    
France, European Court of Human Rights (Application No. 3394/03), Judgment, 10 July 2008 This 
distinction is for the member states of the EU participating in Operation ATALANTA of noteworthy 
importance, as it may have impact on when certain human rights are triggered. 
54 Article on counter-piracy operations. 
 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm?selectedLocale=en  
55 Fact sheet on Operation Ocean Shield  
http://www.aco.nato.int/page208433730.aspx 
 29 
Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), with the sole mission of conducting anti-piracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast in the Indian Ocean.  
In August 2008, CTF 150 and partner forces agreed to the establishment of a 
Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden to serve as a dedicated, more 
secure transit zone for merchant vessels. The MSPA has been credited in part with 
lowering the success rate of Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden transit zone. Within the 
MSPA, eastbound and westbound Internationally Recommended Transit Corridors (IRTC) 
have been established ―to deconflict commercial transit traffic with Yemeni fishermen, 
provide a measure of traffic separation, and allow maritime forces to conduct deterrent 
operations in the [Gulf of Aden] with a greater degree of flexibility.‖   The list of countries 
participating in CTF-151 is fluid and consists of personnel and ships from the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, South Korea, Turkey and Yemen, among 
others. Task force operations are coordinated from the NAVCENT command center in 
Bahrain. U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) operate aboard CTF-
151 vessels and perform support and advisory missions during boarding operations and 
provide training to task force personnel on evidence procedures, maritime law, and related 
issues. As of August 2009, NAVCENT reported that, since January 2009, CTF-151 and 
other cooperating naval forces had ―encountered 527 pirates; 282 of which were disarmed 
and released, 235 disarmed and turned over for prosecution, and 10 were killed.‖ 
The task force works in close co-operation with other naval forces engaged in anti-piracy 
operations in the area, which include the EU Naval Force Somalia, the NATO task force 
and units from individual countries. 
3.2.4 A homogeneous take on use of force against pirates? 
All three major anti-piracy operations off the coast off Somalia are founding their mandate 
in the Security Council resolutions described above. As mentioned, despite the wording of 
the resolutions (all necessary means,) the resolutions were not intended to give legitimize a 
greater use of force against pirates that which is already implied in the UNCLOS. Recent 
events have shown that some countries however, are less reluctant to use deadly force to 
achieve their goals in their combat against piracy. Both France and USA have used military 
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special forces to ―take out‖ pirates when negotiations have failed.56 The use of lethal force 
against Somali pirates has caused some pirates to ―vow to kill French and American 
hostages.‖57 It remains to be seen whether this use of deadly force will act as a deterrent 
against pirates or make the situation escalate to a political conflict. While the three 
international anti-piracy operations mentioned above have common sets of rules of 
engagement that apply to the participating states, there are several states who are 
conducting national anti-piracy operations. These may have different rules of engagement 
and a different take entirely on the use of force against pirates. There is, nevertheless, a 
general consensus among most international actors, that the rules on use of force against 
pirates are sufficient to combat pirates effectively. Rather, it is operational rather than legal 
challenges that are most apparent during the enforcement face of antipiracy operations. The 
investigation following the identification and interception of a pirate ship that have been 
considered a major operational challenge. In that phase which is crucial for the gathering 
and collection of evidence for later criminal proceedings, the dual nature of counter-piracy 
missions becomes evident: military means and military personnel are used for a genuine 
law enforcement task. Military personnel are first and foremost trained and equipped for 
the conduct of hostilities and not for policing functions. Thus, it has happened again and 
again that "the militaries poisoned the investigation" in not securing evidence correctly.
58
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4 A Law on Prosecution? 
4.1 Prosecution under UNCLOS. 
As described earlier, Piracy by its definition can only occur on the High Seas, or in any 
case outside the jurisdiction of any State. Hence, the right of the enforcing State to 
prosecute pirates is only valid if the suspected offense is within the UNLCOS definition of 
piracy. 
The mandate to prosecute pirates is found in article 105 of UNLCOS: ―The courts of the 
State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may 
also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject 
to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.‖ 
 
By its wording, UNCLOS only gives prosecutorial rights to the state of the capturing 
warship; in the way that it may try the suspected pirates before its own courts without 
consulting others. The wording of art. UNCLOS does not provide prosecutorial rights to 
any other parties, such as the flag state, the national states of the crew, nor the national 
states of the suspected pirates. So while the jurisdiction over the interdiction of pirates is 
indeed universal, the jurisdiction over prosecution of pirates according to UNCLOS may 
seem limited to one state, the state that took the suspected pirates captive. It is the capturing 
state that initially ―owns‖ the pirates. 
 
The right to prosecute pirates, however, does not necessarily become the exclusive right of 
the seizing State alone. As a matter of customary international law, every State has 
jurisdiction to prosecute a pirate subsequently present within their territory, irrespective of 
any connection between the pirate, their victims or the vessel attacked and the prosecuting 
State.
59
  States may also have jurisdiction over suspected pirates on other grounds as a 
matter of national law. Following ordinary principles of criminal jurisdiction, the State of 
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  ICJ: ARREST WARRANT OF 11 APRIL 2000 (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE 
CONGO v. BELGIUM) Summary of the Judgment of 14 February 2002. Separate opinion of Judge 
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the suspected pirate‘s nationality, the State of nationality of the suspected pirate‘s victim 
and the flag State of any involved vessels may all also have valid claims of jurisdiction 
over a suspected pirate.
60
 One problem with the universal jurisdiction over piracy supplied 
by UNCLOS is the lack of conflict resolution when several states can claim jurisdiction 
over pirates. This has not yet been a problem in the international community, as it seems 
most states would rather not have full jurisdiction over pirates. 
 Another problem is that UNCLOS to not oblige states to apprehend and prosecute pirates. 
While UNCLOS art. 100 obliges State Parties ―cooperate to the fullest possible extent in 
the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State,‖ this does not put any obligation on the individual states to take it on themselves to 
apprehend and prosecute pirates. One could claim that that entire universal jurisdiction 
adds to conventional categories of international jurisdiction is the ability of unaffected 
nations to prosecute. Given that prosecution is costly, rational, self-interested states would 
not expend scarce resources to punish crimes that did not directly harm them. Nations using 
universal jurisdiction would bear all of the costs of enforcement while receiving none or 
little of the benefits.
61
  
Given that the universal jurisdiction of UNCLOS neither gives jurisdictional priority nor 
obligation to apprehend and prosecute, the jurisdiction over pirates on the High Seas seems 
to be victim to a mix of political will and ―first come, first served‖ policy. Should any 
pirates be apprehended and prosecuted under the universal jurisdiction of UCLOS, their 
fate will be at the arbitrary mercy of the piracy laws of the country that happened to capture 
them.  
4.2 Implication of the UNSCR on the law on prosecution. 
The UNSCR 1816 does not make international law of piracy directly applicable in Somali 
waters. On the high seas the capturing warships determines where the pirates will be tried 
and may try them before their own courts without consulting others. This raises a question 
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as the disposition of any pirates captured in Somali territorial waters under the resolution. 
Legal authority to pursue or arrest pirate vessels as granted by UNSCR 1816 is not the 
same thing as authority to try offenders aboard (prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction). 
Under the resolution: 
Flag, port and coastal States, States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy 
or armed robbery, and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and 
national legislation (are called upon) to cooperate in determining jurisdiction, and in the 
investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the 
coast of Somalia, consistent with applicable international law including international human rights 
law, and to render assistance by, among other actions, providing disposition and logistics 
assistance with respect to person under their jurisdiction and control, victims and witnesses and 
person detained (as suspects)..62 
Clearly, any attacks against or aboard a vessel at sea may leave multiple states capable of 
asserting jurisdiction to prosecute if they can lay hands on the offender. On its face, 
UNSCR 1816 simply lists every conceivable head of jurisdiction, leaving it to the states 
involved to settle ―disposition and logistics.‖ For victims and witnesses this is obviously a 
matter of getting them home safely or on their way, while taking measures to maker their 
evidence available for any subsequent trial. In the case of captured pirates, cooperation in 
―determining jurisdiction… disposition and logistics‖ might be thought a euphemism for 
working out to which they should be handed for prosecution. In fact, there is a prior legal 
choice to make. The eventual disposition of criminals captured in Somali territorial waters 
is either a matter for Somalia (on the theory that the territorial principle applies and 
enforcement jurisdiction has been exercised with Somalia‘s consent) or for the interdicting 
state (on the theory that it has direct authority to deal with the pirates under universal 
jurisdiction of UNCLOS which is extended by the UNSCRs). The matter may simply be 
treated in a memorandum of understanding between cooperating states and Somalia. If not, 
several approaches are possible. On the one hand, the customary principle allowing the 
state where the offender is present to assert jurisdiction over pirates who have fled the high 
seas, may indicate that the coastal state, if any state, should have jurisdiction to prosecute. 
                                                 
62 SC res. 1816 (2008), Para 11. 
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Similarly, one could argue that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction within Somalia‘s 
territorial waters would ordinarily be Somalia‘s sole concern and Somalia should determine 
if who and where the captured offenders are to be tried. On the other hand, the UNSCRs 
allow the use of ―all necessary means‖ to suppress piracy, including action compatible with 
that taken on the High Seas. On the High Seas, the flag state of the interdicting was ship 
has a right to try suspected pirates before national courts. On a broad understanding of ―all 
necessary means‖ and a strained reading of the word ―compatible,‖ this might be thought to 
extend to the capturing state the right to assert prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction. As 
states exercising this power are meant to be cooperating with Somalia, it could seem that 
the UNSCR leaves the question of disposition to Somalia. However, as a practical matter, 
given the limited capacity of the Somali state, the interdicting state having custody will 
likely have the joy of finding a forum to try the suspects. 
Paragraph 9 of UNSCR 1816 provides that the resolution: 
applies only (..) to Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities 
of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under 
(UNCLOS), with respect to any other situation, and underscores in particular that it shall 
not be considered as establishing customary international law. 
This was intended to meet the concern of states, such as Indonesia, wishing to avoid any 
implication that the resolution involved the ―modification, rewriting or redefining‖of the 
principles of UNCLOS.
63
  Indonesia has previously rejected any suggestion that other 
states might conduct counter-piracy operations within areas of the Malacca Strait falling 
under territorial waters. 
The UNSCR 1846 (2008) gave one notable addition to the initial resolution 1816 (2008) 
that is notable, concerning the prosecutorial jurisdiction over suspected pirates. The 
Security Council notes in paragraph 15 of Resolution 1846 (2008) that the SUA convention 
―provides for parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery 
of persons responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control over a ship by force 
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or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation.
64
 This would appear expressly to 
acknowledge the problems encountered in finding states prepared, both in terms of political 
will and adequate national laws, to prosecute acts of piracy lacking any connection with 
their vessels or nationals. The hope seems to be that more states may have national criminal 
laws implementing their obligations under SUA convention than their optional jurisdiction 
under the law of piracy.
65
  
In summary, it may be concluded that states operating in Somali territorial waters, may 
have the right to prosecute pirates, as long as TFG is consensual to the operation in general. 
4.3 SUA and the prosecution of pirates 
The SUA convention and its 2005 Protocol are steps taken by the IMO to improve the 
conditions for combating violent crime against maritime navigation. As of the 2005 
Protocol to the SUA Convention it was extended to include acts of maritime terrorism. 
With The 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention not yet entered into force, there is little in 
these conventions authorizing the use of force against ships hijacked by pirates beyond that 
of the regular jurisdiction of the coastal state to use force within its territorial waters. The 
implication of the SUA Convention of 1988 is that it obliges the State Parties to make 
certain acts illegal when committed towards ships under their flag, ships in their territorial 
water or against their own national.   
The SUA convention takes the form of penal law for the State Parties. It strives to cover 
violent acts against maritime navigation, when these are committed within the territory of a 
State Party. The convention obliges each State Parties to take measures to establish 
jurisdiction over the offenses committed against or on board a ship under their own flag; in 
their own territory, including its territorial sea; by a national of that State; by a stateless 
person whose habitual residence is in that State; in an attempt to compel that State to do or 
abstain from doing any act; or when a national of that State is seized, threatened, injured, or 
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killed during the commission of the offense.66  Thus it strains to establish jurisdiction over 
acts of piracy that are not committed on  the High Seas only, but also acts committed in 
territorial waters, usually referred to as ―armed robbery at sea.‖ Hence, the SUA 
convention is applicable everywhere, even in territorial water  
There are however certain limits to the applicability of the SUA convention. One 
prerequisite is that the ship under attack is coming from or proceeding to an international 
destination (art. 4 SUA convention.)  Secondly, the SUA convention requires the State 
Parties to make convention offences punishable by domestic law. Thus, it is up to the State 
Parties to ensure the enforcement of the convention.
 67
  
Another possible weakness of the SUA conventions is that they require a national or 
territorial link between the State Parties and the alleged offense. A State Party without a 
national or territorial link to the offense committed has no jurisdiction over any such 
offense. Neither does the SUA convention mandate any use of force against persons 
suspected of such acts, leaving it to the political will of the State Parties on how they will 
enforce the regulations of the conventions. 
The main focus of the convention is prosecution and not prevention; its focus is to ensure 
that the State Parties prosecute or extradite. The actual enforcement of the domestic law is 
still at the State Parties discretion. The SUA convention does not authorize any preventive 
activity, such as rescue missions on board hijacked ships. It is not applicable if the violence 
on board is insufficient to compromise maritime safety, and it does not apply to intra-state 
coastal traffic.
68
 
                                                 
66
 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful acts of violence against the safety of  
Maritime Navigation  (SUA) 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/aptmaritime.pdf  
67 ‖Violence at Sea. Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism.‖ Peter Lehr. Chapter 7: ―Piracy and UNLCOS: 
Does International Law Help Regional States Combat Piracy?‖ Martin Murphy. 
68  ‖Violence at Sea. Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism.‖ Peter Lehr. Chapter 7: ―Piracy and UNLCOS: 
Does International Law Help Regional States Combat Piracy?‖ Martin Murphy. 
 
 37 
4.3.1 Obligation to prosecute or extradite under the SUA convention. 
For cases of ―armed robbery at sea,‖ the right to prosecute will be dependent on whether 
the coastal state has established jurisdiction over such crimes, but also the domestic law of 
the flag Ship, the national states of the crew and the suspected pirates. The SUA convention 
1988 obliges the State Parties to establish penal law against pirates in all cases where there 
interests are involved, whether it is as flag state, coastal state or as the home state of crew  
*members or suspected pirates. Although this has not been an issue in the international 
community so far, it could eventually result in overlapping prosecutorial jurisdiction.  
Under Article 6, State Parties must make the offences in Article 3 a crime under national 
law, when committed: (a) against or on board their flag vessels; (b) within their territory, 
including their territorial sea; or(c) by one of their nationals.‘69In addition States parties 
may establish criminal jurisdiction where a relevant offence is committed, against one of 
their nationals or in an effort to compel their government to do or abstain from doing any 
given act.70 The most important jurisdictional provisions are those dealing with the 
obligation to either extradite or submit the case for consideration by prosecutorial 
authorities. Where a State finds a suspect or offender within its territory and another State 
party or parties have jurisdiction under Article 6, then the territorial State: ―shall ... if it 
does not extradite him, be obliged ... to submit the case without delay to its competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws 
of that State.‖ To this end each party is obliged to establish jurisdiction over such offenses 
that are made illegal by the convention.71   
The question arises whether a suspect held aboard a warship is within that flag state‘s 
―territory‖ for the purposes of the SUA Convention duty to extradite or prosecute This is 
somewhat unclear. As described under chapter 6.2 in this thesis, ships are considered by 
customary law to be under the jurisdiction of the flag state. That does not necessarily mean 
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that the physical hull of the ship is to be considered part of the flags states jurisdictiononal 
territory. Some legal experts consider warships not to be ―territory‖ per say, but an object 
with a special status at international law. Human rights bodies or courts have found vessels 
flagged to, or under the effective control of, a State fall within its ―jurisdiction‖ under 
human rights treaties having principally territorial application72. A State‘s sovereign control 
over a warship is much stronger than in the case of other flag vessels: warships on the high 
seas enjoy complete immunity from the jurisdiction of other States. However, simply 
because it is possible for ―territorial‖ obligations to apply on board a warship on the high 
seas, it does not mean that the Flag state will be obligated to prosecute any suspected 
pirates on board. Under the SUA conventions, the State Parties are obliged to submit the 
case to competent authorities for a decision; it‘s not an absolute obligation to prosecute in 
their own national courts. Second, despite the reference to ―extradition‖ any such 
obligation could be considered satisfied where a suspect is put off in the port of a SUA 
Convention party.  
4.4 Status of apprehended pirates. Human rights issues. 
One important legal question is the status of suspected pirates that have been detained by 
warships but not yet transferred to any judicial authority for prosecution. This has to be 
considered in correlation to the legal definition of what the naval forces are doing when 
they are apprehending pirates. Under French law, a captain may apprehend and hold 
pirates, but only a judicial authority can arrest and detain them. The issue of terminology is 
an important one; between capture and their handing over to a judicial authority the pirates 
are ‘in the hands of‘ the navy, to give one example of the language used. 73 Navies whose 
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states are parties to the European Convention on Human Rights are obliged to comply with 
the requirements of that Convention. In the case of Medvedev before the European Court of 
Human Rights, a French naval ship had captured a Cambodian-flagged vessel suspected of 
drug- running. The Court ruled against France for failure to properly inform judicial 
authorities of the navy‘s actions and on the grounds that it did not have a secure basis in 
both international and national law for their arrest. France has appealed to the Grand 
Chamber and is making changes to its system of préfets maritimes. However, the Court 
dismissed a claim that the applicants in Medvedev had not been brought promptly before 
judicial authorities as there was no reasonable alternative to holding them for the 13 days 
required to take them to port. 
Given that it can take many days to get from the Gulf of Aden to Kenya, the most popular 
destination for captured pirates, navies cannot be expected to hand over pirates 
immediately to a judicial authority. There is the question is as to whether this raises 
problems of compatibility with the ECHR (Article 5). Pirates captured in the Gulf of Aden 
are not arrested until they arrive in Kenya, where they see a judge within 24 hours. There is 
a considerable length of time when pirates are not free but have yet to be arrested. Drawing 
on the Medvedev case, one could argue that if the pirates are held in order to be handed 
over to judicial authorities for arrest and detention, and the pirates were in fact taken to the 
appropriate country to be handed over, holding them for the necessary period of time for 
the naval vessel to get to that country should not breach the ECHR. This is a legal issue that 
has yet to be settled in international law. Naturally, the time pirates can be held on board is 
limited. States that choose to apprehend suspected pirates have very little time to decide 
what to do with them, before they are in danger of violating ECHR. In stead of trying to 
find a legal recourse to have suspected pirates prosecuted, it would seem simpler to have 
them released at shore, which would still fulfill the obligations of UNCLOS and the SUA 
convention. 
  
4.5 Prosecution in Kenya and other third states. 
The unwillingness by states to use universal jurisdiction to prosecute Somali pirates 
domestically and the ineffective ―catch and release‖ method that has been the practice by 
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some states, have caused the patrolling nations to find other solutions. One solution has 
been to find another country willing to prosecute the pirates.
74
 In a Memorandum of 
Understanding signed on January 16, 2009 between Kenya and the United States, Kenya 
agreed to try captured pirates.
 75
 This is not the first time Kenya has agreed to such an 
arrangement. In another, Memorandum of Understanding of December 11, 2008, Kenya agreed 
to receive and prosecute suspected pirates captured in the High Seas by the United Kingdom.  
The British regarded Kenya as an alternative to trying suspects in Somalia, which the British 
argued had ―no effective central government or legal system.‖ Further, on Friday, March 6, 
2009, Kenya signed a similar agreement with the European Union 76 Through these agreements 
hundreds of pirates have been transferred to the jurisdiction of Kenya so far. The material 
content of all these memorandums have not been disclosed yet; however, it the transfer of 
suspected pirates to Kenya relies on the willingness of the Kenyan government to take 
responsibility for prosecuting the suspects. 
The various agreements between Kenya and the different western states have been criticized by 
Human Rights Groups because of the lack of guarantees that Human Rights will be respected. 
All though Kenya has been considered far better than its neighbors concerning Human Rights, 
critics have pointed out several breeches to Human Rights in the Kenyan penal system.77  
In December 2009 a group band of suspected Somali pirates captured by the Dutch warship 
participating in the EU operation ATALANTA after a failed attack on a cargo ship were to 
be freed after no country would agree to prosecute them. The decision was made by the EU 
after they had tried in vain to find a country that was willing to prosecute. Despite the fact 
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that EU has signed agreements with the Seychelles and Kenya for them to press charges 
against suspected pirates, the two countries declined to do so.
78
 
The capacity for the courts of the Seychelles and Kenya is not unlimited, and as this recent 
example shows; Kenya is not obliged by its agreements to accept the transfer of suspected 
pirates to their jurisdiction. A growing concern has been that the pirates being transferred to 
Kenyan jurisdiction will bring further backlog to an already overworked penal system.
79
 
Just recently, Kenya refused to accept any more transfers of suspected pirates, on the 
grounds that it did not have the capacity to prosecute more pirates. Also The Seychelles 
have stated that their capacity is overwhelmed.
80
  
4.6 Practical application of the laws on prosecution of pirates, 
Despite the general consensus that all States may have jurisdiction over pirates, one  major 
problem with the many nations participating in the various naval operation mentioned 
above, is that more often then not they practice a ―catch and release‖- policy with captured 
pirates. By this policy, the apprehended pirates are disarmed and the subsequently released 
at shore or back into their own vessels. When a reason for this act is given, it is often that 
the interdicting state finds that it ―does not have jurisdiction‖ to prosecute in national 
courts. This is striking, since most, if not all, countries agree on the universal jurisdiction 
supplied by UNCLOS  on the prosecution of pirate, are parties to the SUA convention; 
even more so since all States participating in anti-piracy seem to have jurisdiction to 
interdict suspected pirate ships. 
4.6.1 Prosecution of suspected pirates under operation ATALANTA 
While the apprehension of suspected pirates is executed under a common set of rules, there 
is no common penal law under the EU that allows for the EU to prosecute pirates. The 
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military personnel involved in the operation can apprehend, detain and transfer persons 
who are suspected of, or who have committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery in the areas 
where they are present. They can seize the vessels of the pirates or the vessels captured 
following an act of piracy or an armed robbery and which are in the hands of the pirates, as 
well as the goods on board. While the mandate of operation ATALANTA provides for the 
right to use force against suspected pirates, the right to prosecute comes from the general 
right to prosecute pirates under UNCLOS art. 105. This results in the interesting situation 
where the Commanding Officer of a vessel may apprehend suspected pirates on behalf of 
the European Union, but it provides the Flag state of that specific vessel with the right to 
prosecute.  
Should the apprehending state be unwilling to prosecute the suspected pirates, the 
suspected pirates may be transferred to ―to a Member States or any third State which 
wishes to exercise its jurisdiction over the aforementioned persons and property.‖81 This 
does not mean that the power to decide if and where to transfer the suspected pirates lies 
exclusively with the apprehending state. Under the NAVFOR command, should the 
apprehending state be unwilling to have the suspected pirates transferred to its jurisdiction, 
it is the Central Command of EUNAVFOR that decides if the suspected pirates should be 
transferred to a third state party or released. 
In February 2009 the Council of the European Union, adopted an agreement with Kenya to 
have suspected pirates transferred to Kenya‘s jurisdiction. This agreement was made in 
accordance with Article 24 of the EU Treaty and was based on the an exchange of letters 
between the European Union and the Government of Kenya on the conditions and 
modalities for the transfer of persons suspected of having committed acts of piracy 
and detained by the European Union-led naval force (EUNAVFOR). In December 2009 a 
similar agreement was concluded with the Seychelles. These agreements allow for the 
transfer of suspected pirates to the jurisdiction of Kenya and Seychelles. 
That the EU can conclude such an agreement on behalf of its member States is based on the 
EU treaty article 24; the legal grounds for Kenya and the Seychelles to prosecute suspected 
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pirates to a third country is based on customary international law that any state may 
prosecute a suspected pirate present within their territory. The legal grounds for the actual 
transfer may be found in The SUA Convention article 6.  
4.6.2 Prosecution of suspected pirates under  
Operation Ocean Shield and CTF 151 
The ships participating in the NATO operation Ocean Shield as well as the ships 
participating in the US led operation Combined Task Force 151 are under respective central  
military command. The NATO does not, however, have a common set of rules on how to 
allow for the prosecution of suspected pirates (nor does the CTF 151). Since there are no 
uniform international laws on how to prosecute these pirates, each state uses its own 
national law. This practice means that even when working under the NATO-led operations, 
it is left up to each state to decide the fate of apprehended pirates. If a state does not have 
any legal recourse, captured pirates are set free. The European Allies participating in 
NATO the operation also do not transfer these pirates to any country that still possesses the 
death penalty as a legal recourse.
82
 It is up to the individual participating nations to 
establish relevant domestic law, or conclude bilateral extradition treaties with countries 
willing and able to prosecute suspected pirates.  
On January 16, 2009, Kenya and the United States signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) under which Kenya agreed to try suspected pirates captured by the 
U.S. 
83
 This allows for the transfer of suspected pirates captured by U.S forces to be 
transferred to the jurisdiction of Kenya, and formalizes an ad-hoc agreement between the 
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two respective countries. This MOU is similar to the agreement between the European 
Union and Kenya, as well as the agreement between United Kingdoms and Kenya. 
As with the EU operation ATALANTA, right to prosecute pirates that are apprehended 
under Operation Ocean Shield or Combined Task Force 151 stems from the universal 
jurisdiction provided in UNCLOS. This mean that while the order to capture suspected 
pirates may come from a central command, the responsibility for the suspected pirates lies 
solely with the flag states of the capturing warship. Should the interdicting states not wish 
to prosecute, they are not obliged by the mandate of their operations to transfer them to a 
state party who is willing to prosecute (unlike EU countries under operation 
ATALANTA).
84
 
4.6.3 USA 
U.S. courts are reluctant to exercise jurisdiction unless the vessel involved is American.
85
. 
The United States of America currently has ships operating in two different anti-piracy 
operations in the Red Sea: the NATO operation Ocean Shield, as well as the US-led 
operation Maritime Force (Combined Task Force 151). The vast majority of pirates 
apprehended by US ships in the two operations have been either disarmed and released, or 
transferred to Kenya for prosecution. Only in the case of the hijacking of Maersk Alabama, 
and the following rescue of the ship and later the captain, it was decided to bring the 
surviving pirate to the United States for arrest and prosecution. This decision was made 
based on the fact that Maersk Alabama was sailing under the flag of the United States of 
America and all of the crew members where American citizens.  
4.6.4  Germany  
Similar to USA, Germany has been unwilling to prosecute pirates without a direct threat to 
national interests. Under the German Code of Criminal Procedure criminal acts that have 
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been committed on the High Seas, outside German territory, as is the case when a vessel 
flying the German flag has been attacked, are usually dealt with by the Public Prosecutor's 
office at the ship's port of registry (10 StPO).
86
  In the case of attacks affecting maritime 
transport (316c German Criminal Code), German law prescribes that prosecution is the 
responsibility of the German authorities.  In case of crimes committed abroad, the Public 
Prosecutor does not have the same strict obligation to prosecute which it has in domestic 
crime. Criminal prosecution measures may be initiated by the Public Prosecutor at its 
discretion (153c StPO). Active prosecution measures will only be initiated if the German 
State has a particular, well-defined interest in prosecution. By the definition of the German 
government
87
 that includes cases:  
- when German nationals have been killed or injured  
- when a ship flying the German flag has been attacked by pirates  
- when pirates are blackmailing a German shipping company  
- when pirates have been detained by the German Navy  
Germany has as of yet not attempted to have pirates prosecuted in German courts. In august 
2009 a German warship apprehended a pirate boat near the Somali coast and found AK-47 
assault rifles, ammunition and anti-tank weapons on board. Despite the explosive 
discovery, the pirates went free after being disarmed.
88
  
On two separate occasions in the first quarter of 2009 pirates where arrested after 
attempting to attack German ships. Both these groups were first transferred to German war 
ships, and then transferred to Kenyan authorities for prosecution.
89
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4.6.5  Denmark 
Denmark is currently operating in the NATO operation Ocean Shield and the US-led 
operation Maritime Force.  Denmark has no provisions in their penal codes to treat piracy 
as a punishable offence. It should however, be mentioned that Denmark is party to the 1988 
SUA convention which obliges them to make such offences punishable by law.  
Lacking a legal recourse to prosecute pirates, Denmark has elected to find other ways of 
dealing with apprehended pirates. In the start of the anti-piracy operations, Demark 
followed the catch and release policy, by disarming and releasing apprehended pirates. 90 
The Danish Navy ship Absalon on 17 September 2008 captured 10 pirates in the waters off 
Somalia. After six days ‘ detention and the confiscation of their weapons, ladders, and 
other implements used to board ships, the Danish government decided to free the pirates by 
putting them ashore on a Somali beach. The Danish authorities had come to the conclusion 
that the pirates risked torture and the death penalty if surrendered to (whatever) Somali 
authorities. This was unacceptable, as Danish law prohibits the extradition of criminals 
when they may face the death penalty. Moreover, they were not ready to try them in 
Denmark as it would be difficult (in light of the possible abuses they would risk) to deport 
them back to Somalia after their sentences were served
91
.  
In May 2009, five suspected Somali pirates nabbed by the Danish navy went on trial in a 
court in the Netherlands.
92
  All though Denmark is a member of the European Union, it 
cannot participate in the EU transfer agreement due to its defense opt-out, and has therefore 
worked to enter its own individual bilateral agreements with Kenya and Tanzania. These 
agreements will contain regulations for compliance with fundamental human rights, 
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including the inapplicability of the death penalty in connection with the receiving country‘s 
treatment of suspected pirates. An agrement with Kenya was finalized in July 2009. 
93
 
4.6.6 France 
While France is participating in the EU operation ATALANTA it has the option to transfer 
apprehended pirates to Kenya or the Seychelles on the basis of the agreements between EU 
and the two respective countries. Unlike most western countries, France has also made the 
decision to try a group of suspected pirates before a national court, after a hijacking 
incident in 2008.
94
  
France is also participating in the US-led coalition Maritime Force. On several occasions 
where the French ships participating in this operation have apprehended pirates, the French 
government decided to send the suspected pirates to Puntland for prosecution
95, Somalia‘s 
northern breakaway region. 
4.6.7 The Netherlands  
The Netherlands are participating in the EU operation ATALANTA as well as the NATO 
operation Ocean Shield. For the duration of these operations, the Dutch warships have on 
several occasions apprehended suspected pirates. The consequences for the pirates for 
being apprehended by the Dutch have been arbitrary at best. 
The Dutch ship participating in the EU operation, is under the policy of the EU and Somali 
pirates apprehended by it may be transferred to Kenya, if the Netherlands do not want to 
prosecute. The Dutch ship participating in the NATO operation does not have such an 
option. In April 2009 Dutch navy soldiers from the frigate 'De Zeven Provinciën' boarded a 
fishing boat in the Gulf of Aden with nine Somalis on board who had attempted to kidnap a 
Greek-owned freighter. The soldiers confiscated machine guns and an anti-tank missile, 
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and freed sixteen Yemeni fishermen who had been held captive on their own boat and used 
for forced labor for the past week. After interrogating the Somalis, the Dutch commander 
let the pirates go. The decision to release the suspected pirates was made by a deputy 
officer from the Dutch Justice Ministry on board the ship. In this case, the decision whether 
or not to prosecute detained pirates was left up to the Netherlands because De Zeven 
Provinciën was part of the NATO-mission and the alliance had not made any agreements 
about prosecution  
In the Netherlands, it is still disputed whether or not the Netherlands have jurisdiction to 
prosecute pirates. While some experts argue that the UNCLOS allows for any country to 
prosecute pirates, the official policy from the Dutch government has been that prosecution 
in the Netherlands should only happen if there is a ―clear Dutch interest.‖ 
In early 2009, the Netherlands did detain and prosecute five suspected pirates who had 
hijacked a ship sailing under the flag of the Dutch Antilles. 
96
  Although piracy is outlawed 
in the Nether lands by article 381 of the criminal code, it had never before been applied in a 
Dutch criminal court.
97
 
5 Conclusion 
The international legal framework establishes a series of different options to have 
suspected pirates apprehended and prosecuted.  While the International community seems 
to have no problems interdicting suspected pirates on the high seas, the failure to prosecute 
suspected pirates has been a recurring problem. One problem seems to be that UNLCOS 
which regulates the jurisdiction over pirates on the High Seas does not oblige any states to 
prosecute the suspected pirates. The SUA convention on the other hand, obliges the 
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member States to either prosecute pirates or extradite them to countries that are having the 
possibility to prosecute. However, as stated above, obligation to extradite may simply mean 
handing suspected pirates over to some other state that has jurisdictional claims over them, 
i.e. setting them ashore in another SUA member state. Furthermore, should a state follow 
all its international obligations, whether it can or will prosecute suspected pirates under its 
jurisdiction is still dependent on domestic law. While the SUA conventions obliges is 
member states to amend domestic law in order to provide jurisdiction over suspected 
pirates in any case, it does not oblige them to actually prosecute. Piracy is considered an 
international crime, but it is not subject to an international obligation to prosecute, unlike 
other international crimes.
98
 Hence, the obligation to prosecute would have to be 
incorporated in domestic law. In the penal system of most States the obligation to prosecute 
criminal acts is never completely absolute, but subject to an evaluation of whether the 
crime in itself is worth prosecuting on the background of its heinousness and not the least, 
what damaging effects it has had to the society in question. The standards for this 
evaluation are set by the political governance of the state in question. This means that in the 
end, it‘s up to the political will of the respective countries whether the suspected pirates are 
prosecuted or not.  
The logistical and legal burdens involved in transporting pirate suspects to Western 
countries can be daunting. Building a trial, gathering the evidence and witnesses is both 
costly and time consuming, and the benefit for the prosecuting state may be questionable. If 
a prosecution fails, the burden lies with that country. Furthermore, there is always the 
prospect the suspected pirate might then claim asylum.
99
  
 
Some countries, such as Germany and Russia, have argued for the establishment of an 
international court to prosecute pirates. As the option for to transfer the suspected pirates to 
Kenya or The Seychelles seems to be no longer viable, and the willingness to prosecute 
pirates in national courts is lacking, this might be the only solution with a future. However, 
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while it may solve the jurisdictional concerns, and may ensure that all apprehended pirates 
are prosecuted, it does not solve the question of where the pirates should be imprisoned 
after an eventual verdict. An international court would certainly require high Human Right 
standards off the prisons where the pirates would be incarcerated. This means that the 
pirates in effect would not be returned to Somalia, because of the failing prison system. 
Any State that accepts Somali pirates either to be prosecuted in a national court or to serve 
a prison sentence, would still run the risk of the pirates being ―non-returnable‖ on 
humanitarian grounds, because of the situation in Somalia. This is one of the main reasons 
for the States being unwilling to attempt to prosecute pirates in the first place; an 
international court would not solve this problem. 
Another way to solve the problem of the reluctance to prosecute might be to make the 
prosecution of apprehended pirates obligatory in international law, at the same level as 
other international crimes. 
100
  
Without a change in the practice of international law or a major shift in the political will of 
the states involved in anti-piracy operations, the majority of apprehended pirates will not be 
prosecuted, and the practice of catch-and-release will be continued. In any event, the final 
solution to the piracy problem must be sought not only in the context of the legal 
framework, but in the political will of the international community to resolve the situation 
in Somalia. Without a more stable Somali state, the prospect of solving the piracy problem 
remains dim.  
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